L’iceberg si avvicina.

E quando un enorme montagna di ghiaccio si fa più vicina, la temperatura scende i su rischia il congelamento.

Ecco spiegato perché, proprio la settimana scorsa, abbiamo letto il titolo “Congelati dalla paura” che tutti potete rileggere subito qui sotto.

A che cosa si riferisce, il titolo qui sopra? Ai Fondi Comuni di Investimento in Europa. E nello specifico, a che cosa si riferisce? Alla crisi che è in atto da mesi, della quale avete avuto, attraverso questo sito, una puntuale e qualificata informazione.

Avete avuto informazione da noi di Recce’d e da pochi altri mezzi di informazione in Italia.

Il che è davvero curioso, perché la notizia è di prima pagina nel Mondo.

Riportiamo, allo scopo di ricapitolare (in modo sintetico) quello che sta succedendo, il testo dell’articolo qui di seguito.

Dopo avere letto questo articolo, date uno sguardo anche al grafico che abbiamo ricavato da un articolo del Financial Times che tratta del medesimo tema.

Ed infine, dopo che avete visto il grafico del Financial Times, rileggete ciò che disse il Grande Capo della Società Amundi (Fondi Comuni) solo qualche settimana, fa, a proposito della liquidità REALE e non di fantasia dei vostri Fondi Comuni.

Fatte queste tre cose, però, il nostro suggerimento è: NON fermatevi, fate qualche cosa, agite, difendetevi.

Non state lì paralizzati dalla paura: anzi congelati dalla paura, come scrive Bloomberg poco sopra.

The warning signs are piling up for investors in funds that sink their money into hard-to-sell securities. In recent months we’ve seen the demise of Neil Woodford’s business empire and a crisis at H2O Asset Management, triggered by their holdings of unlisted companies and unrated bonds. Now Woodford’s protege Mark Barnett has fallen into a similar trap, resulting in Morningstar Inc.’s downgrade of two funds he runs at Invesco Ltd.

All this drama has left unnerved investors wondering: who’s next? Here’s a timeline of the main events that brought us here:

June 3

Woodford, long one of Britain’s most celebrated money managers, stops redemptions from his flagship LF Woodford Equity Income Fund. The freeze is meant to buy him time to sell down the fund’s “unquoted and less liquid stocks” and meet the demands of clients who want their money back after a run of poor performance.

June 19

Morningstar suspends its rating of an H2O Asset Management fund, citing concerns about the “liquidity and appropriateness” of some corporate-bond holdings. H20 is a major holder of rarely traded bonds issued by companies linked to German financier Lars Windhorst. The fund also allows clients to make frequent withdrawals, creating the potential for a liquidity crunch.

June 24

Natixis SA goes into crisis-fighting mode to stem a wave of outflows from its H2O Asset Management unit, selling about 300 million euros ($332 million) of its unrated private bonds and marking down the balance to remove incentives for investors to pull even more.

June 26

Bank of England Governor Mark Carney reprimands investment funds that hold illiquid assets while allowing unlimited withdrawals. “These funds are built on a lie,” he tells Parliament, heaping pressure on Woodford and H2O.

July 1

H2O Asset Management halts an eight-day skid during which a group of six key funds plunged by more than 8 billion euros. The firm had taken steps to arrest the decline in assets by dropping entry fees for all of its funds, selling some unrated private bonds and proposing to create a so-called “deep value” fund for thinly traded assets.

July 11

Carney says Woodford’s decision to lock his main fund is “symptomatic of a broader problem.” The central bank says in a report that the mismatch created when funds offer daily redemptions while loading up on hard-to-sell assets could lead to runs, and this has the potential to become a financial-stability risk.

July 29

Woodford’s listed investment trust says it’s considering replacing him as portfolio manager, deepening his career crisis. On the same day, the administrator of his flagship fund says it may remain locked until December.

September 30

The U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority stiffens its rules for funds that invest in hard-to-sell property assets in the first major rule change since the crises that struck Woodford and H2O.

October 15

Woodford runs out of road in his attempt to salvage his investment business. The administrator of his flagship fund ousts Woodford as manager and sends it into liquidation. Woodford objects, but before the day’s done he announces that he’s shutting his firm, Woodford Investment Management. The firm terminates its agreement to manage Woodford Patient Capital Trust.

November 6

Barnett, who followed Woodford’s lead in loading up on less liquid securities, is hit with rating downgrades on two of his funds at Invesco. Morningstar cites concerns about the way he’d changed the focus of his funds to buy smaller companies that are harder to sell.

Amundi’s   chief investment officer has warned the asset management sector could be on the verge of a wider liquidity crisis, amid heightened scrutiny by investors in the wake of Neil Woodford’s downfall.

“This business is a trade-off between risk, return and liquidity. We have the ingredients of looming liquidity mismatches across the industry,” said Pascal Blanqué.

The CIO’s comments reflect growing concerns that some open-ended funds could suffer the same fate as Woodford by struggling to sell some of their holdings fast enough to pay back investors.

According to Blanqué, a cause for concern is that banks have reduced their dealer and market making activity following the global financial crisis. Banks have retreated from their past role by scaling back the amount of risk they take in part because of more stringent capital requirements from regulators.

Blanqué said that banks’ diminished ability to absorb liquidity demand during selloff periods could pose wider problems for fund managers.

“We’ve seen a frantic search for yield on the buy side, pushed by [central banks’ quantitative easing programs],” said Blanqué. “The combination of a frantic search for yield, and the deterioration of market liquidity, can create mismatches.”

Blanqué’s comments come as fund liquidity has been thrown into the spotlight following liquidity problems encountered by high profile asset managers including Woodford, H2O and GAM.

In June, Morningstar suspended its bronze rating on H2O’s Allegro fund due to concerns over the liquidity of bonds linked to Lars Windhorst, the German entrepreneur with a history of bankruptcies. H2O subsequently offloaded a significant chunk of private, nonrated debt and removed entry fees in an attempt to stem investor outflows.

Woodford, once a star stock picker in the U.K., was forced to close his investment business on October 16 after being sacked as manager on his flagship £2.9bn Equity Income fund.

Link Fund Solutions, which acts as the authorized corporate director to the Equity Income fund, took the decision to suspend dealing in the vehicle on June 3 to allow some of its most illiquid holdings to be sold to pay back investors wanting to exit.

In 2018, Swiss asset manager GAM was forced to close several bond funds managed by Haywood to stem investor outflows and sell off some of the products’ most illiquid holdings to pay back investors.

Blanqué said: “There is a severe underestimation of the effective liquidity of what is supposed to be liquid.”

“At the fund level, the regulators are going in the direction where the buy side must be ready to show effective liquidity policies.

“At the corporate level, we think that asset managers are, generally speaking, under-capitalised relative to the liquidity they may face.”

He added: “The very concept of liquidity is poorly defined. You will see regulators asking buy side actors to at least be more precise about what they mean by liquidity and explain their crisis management.”

Mentre il grande naviglio con quattro camini si avvia lento verso il colossale iceberg, sul ponte più in alto si balla felici.

Che cosa c’è di più festoso di una lunga crociera, un’orchestra che suona, champagne a volontà, e la mancanza di ogni preoccupazione?

Gira voce, tra i ballerini, che ci sia la possibilità di un iceberg: ma la risposta della maggior parte dei viaggiatori è sempre la stessa. “Non è ancora successo”. “Non ho sentito il botto”. “Lo dicono sempre, ma non succede mai”.

E soprattutto: “Ma perché dovrei essere io il primo ad occuparmene?”, “Qui tutti ballano, e io non sarò certo il primo a smettere”, “Sono tutti felici: mica saranno tutti dei fessi”.

C’è però chi insiste sull’iceberg che si avvicina: ma viene etichettato come “allarmista”, “disfattista”, e peggio ancora “contrarian”. Che significa poi: uno che dice il contrario di quello che dicono tutti, e per partito preso.

Per queste ragioni, in Recce’d ci colpì moltissimo leggere, pochi giorni fa, il titolo ed il contenuto dell’articolo di Bloomberg che anche voi potete leggete qui sotto.

Articolo che (come abbiamo messo per voi in evidenza in questa immagine) è firmato dalla Redazione, il che significa che è un articolo a cui si affida la linea editoriale di Bloomberg.

Bloomberg oggi è il mezzo di informazione più autorevole, e più diffuso, sui mercati finanziari.

Quella che leggete qui sotto è la loro presa di posizione ufficiale.

Quando Recce’d scrive queste medesime cose (e non da oggi), c’è sempre qualcuno che ci etichetta come “contrarian” (sbagliando completamente nell’utilizzo di questa etichetta, come abbiamo già spiegato).

Allora, quel 21 ottobre, ci siamo tutti domandati, in Recce’d, come fosse possibile che il mezzo di informazione più diffuso, il mainstream per eccellenza, fosse su posizioni che il pubblico giudica “contrarian”.

Può darsi che si sbagli Bloomberg? Oppure, più probabilmente, chi appiccica l’etichetta di “contrarian” non è bene informato.

Per mettere tutti i lettori nella migliore condizione per giudicare, noi abbiamo deciso di riportare tutto l’articolo di seguito al grafico. E dopo l’avere letto l’articolo, noi vi proporremo le nostre considerazioni.

The world’s finance ministers and central-bank governors gathered this past weekend in Washington and looked out at a global economy badly in need of treatment. Most say they understand the dangers, but that seems open to question. With the facts in plain sight and the need for policy changes all too apparent, they’ve shown little sense of urgency, and even less sign of action. Prodded by an unhinged U.S. administration, the world could be stumbling into the next global recession.

The International Monetary Fund has lowered its growth forecasts yet again. Global output is projected to rise by just 3% this year (down from the 3.3% predicted in the spring) and by a still-sluggish 3.4% (down from 3.6%) in 2020. Economic momentum is fading almost everywhere — the IMF calls it a “synchronized slowdown.” The revised outlook is already the weakest since the crash 10 years ago, and the risks in the forecast are very much, as economists say, to the downside.

This would be concerning under any circumstances, but the prospect of recession under current conditions is truly alarming. The hesitant recovery of the past decade has depleted the conventional tools of macroeconomic policy. In many countries — not least the U.S. — fiscal stimulus and persistent budget deficits have boosted ratios of public debt to national income. Next time, governments will be reluctant to lean as heavily on extra public borrowing to raise demand, rightly or wrongly fearing lack of fiscal space. Monetary policy is all but exhausted too, with interest rates either close to their effective lower bound (as in the U.S.) or slammed down against it (as in the European Union).

Another legacy of that previous recession, and the extraordinary measures taken to contain it, is heightened financial fragility. With abundant quantitative easing and super-low interest rates, financial conditions have been kept loose to support asset prices, press down on yields and strengthen demand. The measures were necessary, but the result is outlandish asset valuations and heightened credit risk. Recklessly inflated house prices were a main cause of the crash; in many countries, they’ve soared again on the back of cheap credit. Banks have added capital since 2009, but not enough to make them safe in another big downturn. The notorious “doom loop” of risky sovereign debt and bank insolvency — recognized as a major risk after 2008 — remains substantially unaddressed in Italy and other countries.

With all these vulnerabilities to the fore, and with few if any policy options for dealing with the crash they might cause, U.S. President Donald Trump chose to embark on his trade war with China, and threatened any other country that caught his attention with the same. This astounding recklessness, unaccountably tolerated by Congress, has already caused enormous economic damage, not least in the U.S. Should the synchronized slowdown become an outright worldwide recession, the U.S. government will get, and deserve, much of the blame.

But the responsibility goes wider. Other countries could be doing far more to guard against these heightened risks.

China, for instance, has been too slow to address its financial imbalances. No doubt, Trump’s trade war has made this harder, but the Beijing government has made little progress in repairing its credit-allocation system. Under pressure, the resulting financial vulnerabilities could surface abruptly, with consequences not just for China. The U.K. has lately seemed intent on wrecking its economy and system of government in pursuit of Brexit. The EU has had years to equip the euro area with two basic necessities of a single-currency area — a common budget to mitigate recessions and a functioning banking union — and has provided neither. In every part of the world, governments have dithered over reforms that would make their economies more productive and robust. With risks mounting almost wherever you look, political dysfunction has conspired to make things worse.

Given the will, all of these problems are fixable. Some, to be sure, could be solved at a stroke. The risks posed by Trump’s trade wars, for instance, would evaporate if he merely refrained from stirring pointless conflict. Others are much more complex. Reducing fragility requires smarter regulation, to recognize the risks that arise from constantly evolving financial systems. Reviving macroeconomic policy in a world of persistently low interest rates demands fresh thinking on both monetary and fiscal fronts. Answers will be found and are starting to emerge, but governments should step up the pace.

These questions can’t wait any longer. The world economy is at a dangerous juncture, and stands desperately in need of wiser and more effective leadership. Until it gets some, the risks are unlikely to subside.

Le affermazioni di Bloomberg, che avete appena letto nell’articolo che noi vi abbiamo riproposto, sono fondate su fatti: e per questo, sono indiscutibili.

Non siamo noi di Recce’d a dirvelo: attenzione. Sono Mario Draghi e Jay Powell, e da ormai alcuni mesi: con le parole, ma soprattutto con i fatti. Primo fra tutti la scelta di riprendere le politiche da “crisi economica profonda” come il QE, scelta che la BCE e la Federal Reserve (immagine qui sopra) hanno fatto nel mese di settembre (anche se la Fed NON lo vuole ammettere: ma i numeri del grafico vanno ben al di là delle parole)

Al tempo stesso, in Recce’d siamo stati molto colpito dal tono dell’articolo in questione: esplicito e persino aggressivo, non in linea con la tradizione delle stampa anglosassone che si occupa di finanza (non stiamo per carità parlando della stampa in Italia, e neppure di macchine della propaganda come FOX News oppure CNBC).

Per questo motivo, noi colleghiamo quell’articolo molto esplicito ad una notizia di pochi giorni fa, che vi riportiamo con l’immagine che chiude questo Post.

Il contenuto dell’articolo, lo ripetiamo, è del tutto condivisibile, a nostro parere. Ma ci auguriamo che l’utilizzo dei mezzi di informazione come strumenti di propaganda, portato a livelli mai visti prima dalla Amministrazione Trump, NON venga adottato anche dai suoi oppositori.

Non avremmo alcuna voglia, in quanto professionisti della gestione dei portafogli in titoli, di dovere affrontare un diluvio di “fake news” da una parte e poi anche dall’altra. Ma naturalmente, nel vostro e nel nostro interesse, ci siamo già messi in allerta.

Mentre il transatlantico si avvicina all’iceberg, sul ponte principale del transatlantico l’orchestra continua a suonare, e una parte dei passeggeri continua a ballare.

Preferiscono non sapere. Preferiscono continuare a godere. Anche se si tratta di una illusione, preferiscono godersi un momento indimenticabile.

Ma il Capitano? Il Capitano del transatlantico non dovrebbe proteggere i passeggeri?

Il Capitano ha paura, è preoccupato, teme il licenziamento e la rovina. E quindi, non soltanto non informa i passeggeri. Il Capitano punta sul “tenere tutti tranquilli”, e per questo ripete ogni minuto all’impianto interfono sempre la stessa frase: “va tutto benissimo, state tranquilli”.

E lo fa con impressionante regolarità. Rivediamo ad esempio con voi i messaggi arrivati nella settimana appena conclusa.

Primo messaggio di lunedì 4 novembre.

Un secondo messaggio di lunedì 4 novembre-

Passiamo a martedì 5 novembre.

Passiamo poi a mercoledì 6 novembre: un messaggio dal quale (è evidente) traspare lo stato di agitazione del Capitano, e la sua conseguente confusione mentale.

Per arrivare poi a giovedì 7 novembre: e qui, come leggete, c’è qualche viaggiatore del transatlantico che si fa una domanda, e comincia a dubitare che il Capitano sappia quello che dice.

Venerdì 8 novembre, però, la situazione esplode: per rispondere a ciò che dice la stampa, prima del Capitano parlano i membri dell’equipaggio, e così si crea un gran caos.

Vediamo prima che cosa si legge sui giornali.

Poi, vediamo che cosa ci racconta un Alto Ufficiale del Transatlantico.

Un ufficiale della nave dice che “forse c’è un iceberg davanti a noi”. Subito, interviene però un secondo ufficiale, a rassicurare tutti: l’orizzonte è libero da ostacoli.

Ed alla fine, interviene il Capitano: che dice alcune frasi, ma non chiarisce e sembra essere in confusione (lo leggete sotto nell’ultima immagine del Post).

I viaggiatori del Transatlatico, loro, continuano a ballare: fanno attenzione alla musica che suona, un allegro fox-trot, e non si occupano della rotta.

Per la rotta, si affidano al Capitano.

E voi, lettori, che fate? Vi affidate al Capitano, per decidere che cosa fare dei vostri risparmi e per i vostri investimenti?

Come sempre accade, sono i più deboli a pagare per gli errori del Capitano.

Ed è per questo che, su un ponte più in basso, non sul punto dove ci sono orchestra e ballerini, circola un diffuso allarme. Mentre più sopra invece non si vuole sentire, non si vuole sapere, e si continua a ballare.

Ed i segnali diventano, ora dopo ora sempre più evidenti.

Ce lo racconta anche Bloomberg, con un grafico molto efficace (sotto) che Bloomberg ha commentato come segue.

From Hong Kong to Chile and Lebanon, violent clashes between protesters and police have turned capital cities into danger zones, sparking growth fears and market slumps. Different countries have different challenges, but at the same time, there are common factors at work, according to research by Bloomberg Economics. Throwing most of the world’s economies onto a chart with inequality on one axis and government effectiveness on the other shows that the current trouble spots are by no means the worst performers. As global growth slows, the problem of social instability could turn out to be rather widespread.

Sul transatlantico c’è chi balla e chi invece è preoccupato: tra i due, uno solo avrà ragione, e lo diranno i fatti.

Nel frattempo, si seguono le notizie che arrivano sul transatlantico via telegrafo.

Come diceva pochi giorni fa anche il titolo di un articolo del Financial Times, è sempre importate sapere distinguere tra i segnali che ci porta il telegrafo.

Alcuni messaggi ci dicono che tutto è tranquillo, qualcuno ci dice che le cose non potrebbero andare meglio. Altri messaggi dicono esattamente l’opposto: che un grande rischio sta davanti a noi, e si avvicina ogni momento.

Non è una buona idea dividersi tra ottimisti e pessimisti. Non serve a nulla, schierarsi con gli ottimisti, oppure con i pessimisti. Non cambia nulla

La sola cosa che cambia, e che può aiutare i passeggeri del transatlantico a decidere, è: c’è davvero un iceberg? E ci stiamo avvicinando?

Ad esempio, un segnale come quello del grafico qui sopra, come va interpretato?

Deve essere interpretato INSIEME con altri segnali. Noi, per i Clienti, lo abbiamo fatto da lunedì scorso a venerdì scorso nella nostra Sezione Operatività. Le conclusioni sono chiarissime, così tanto chiare da risultare persino banali.

Ogni investitore deve affidarsi al proprio giudizio: ma deve farsi un giudizio basandosi selezionando i messaggi che arrivano sul transatlantico con il telegrafo. Alcuni sono veri messaggi. Altri sono semplicemente falsi.

Si salveranno soltanto quelli che sanno distinguere i secondi e fidarsi dei primi.

Leggiamo come il Financial Times descrive la situazione attuale, nell’articolo che abbiamo citato più sopra.

When a market narrative shifts, investors should be sure to weigh the merits of the new message. No matter that much of the current economic data is murky, or that the road toward a trade resolution between Washington and Beijing is a long and winding one. There is no mistaking the changed mood of financial markets: the threat of a hard landing for the global economy is behind us, and a rebound beckons. But the extent and scope of an economic recovery in 2020 remains very much a point of conjecture. Bullish equity-market sentiment ultimately requires a substantial rebound in business investment that reflates the global economy. Evidence of such a surge may not arrive until the spring of next year at the earliest. November has provided some signs that the worst of the soft patch is behind the global economy, while reports emerging from the ongoing US-China trade talks suggest that both sides can see plenty to gain from a deal.

As a result, global bond yields have climbed to their highest levels in more than three months, with ten-year yields in France back above zero for the first time since July. Record highs for various equity markets are being characterised by big rotations between sectors and regions. Leadership has tilted in favour of cyclical sectors that tend to do better when economic activity is stronger. So-called “value” shares — typified by global financials, which have been hit hard by negative interest rates in Japan and Europe, and then the summer fears of recession — are powering up. This trend is amplified by rising long-dated government bond yields, which normally benefit banks as they can lend at higher rates while their cost of funding is negligible.

The recovery in global financial stocks has mirrored the rise in global bond yields since mid-August, prompting talk that the rotation towards value, the bargain bin of equities, has more room to run. Equity markets in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region — with their big weightings of financials and value candidates — have outperformed even a record-setting Wall Street. Investors are overlooking quarterly results which show profits falling for both S&P 500 and Stoxx 600 companies, preferring to focus on sunnier forecasts for next year.

True, equities have endured periods of falling earnings in the past. At the moment, the S&P 500 is on course to match the fallow run recorded over four consecutive quarters spanning 2015 and 2016. The current bullish sentiment reflects plenty of faith that the squeezing of profit margins will abate for both European and US companies next year, as growth picks up. The shift in mood is illustrated by the 25 per cent jump in the share price of Caterpillar over the past month. The stock of the heavy machinery maker, which is often seen as a barometer of the global industrial economy, was lower for the year by some 7 per cent in early October. That was before the company reported disappointing earnings and lowered guidance for the full year. No matter: this week the stock registered a fresh 52 week high. As an investment manager explained to me, the resurgence in the company’s stock tells us that earnings and recession fears were overdone. The pendulum is swinging back.

Another consideration is that the brighter signs over trade mask a much more powerful driver of longer-term bullish sentiment: expectations of fiscal stimulus. Greater government spending is certainly on the agenda for the UK economy and an equity market that has been largely ignored by foreign investors, who have favoured gilts since the 2016 Brexit referendum. It is not difficult to build a case for a rotation into stocks and out of government debt as the Treasury ramps up spending in 2020. Across the channel, the recent performance of European shares and cyclicals also reflects in part expectations of greater state spending — even from a reluctant Germany — and a growing recognition of the damage inflicted by negative interest rates in some policymaking circles. The prospect of fiscal ammunition being deployed, along with fading prospects of an escalation in the trade war, explains much of the current enthusiasm within equity markets.

Not everyone is convinced that this marks the start of a radical change for investment strategies that have grown dependent on high-quality bonds and stocks. The trends of modest economic growth in mature economies, and slowing momentum across the emerging world, appear well entrenched. David Bianco, chief investment officer for the Americas at DWS, the asset manager, says that he and his colleagues still find it hard to “abandon our longstanding preference for profitable growth stocks over cyclical value stocks.’’ As a clearing house of countless information and investment decisions, markets generate plenty of noise and at times, misleading signals. Responding to the right ones is the challenge facing investors as they tweak portfolios for the year ahead.