Potrebbe andare avanti così ... per sempre? (parte 4)
Non siamo certamente i soli a pensarla in questo modo. Ovvero: nel modo che abbiamo dettagliato nei tre precedenti Post con questo stesso titolo.
Ci sembra però decisivo prendere nota del fatto che, sui mercati, circola una voce: ovvero: che come noi la penserebbe anche qualcuno alla Federal Reserve. Una indiscrezione, uscita da un incontro a porte chiude di domenica scorsa, racconta che il Capo della fed di New York, Bill Dudley, avrebbe detto queste parole:
As I see it, financial conditions are a key transmission channel of monetary policy because they affect households’ and firms’ saving and investment plans and thus influence economic activity and the economic outlook. If the response of financial conditions to changes in short-term interest rates were rigid and predictable, then there would be no need to pay such close attention to financial conditions. But, as we all know, the linkage is in fact quite loose and variable.
For example, during the mid-2000s, financial conditions failed to tighten even as the Federal Reserve pushed its federal funds rate target up from 1 percent to 5¼ percent. Conversely, at the height of the crisis, financial conditions tightened sharply even as the Federal Reserve aggressively pushed its federal funds rate target down toward zero. As a result, monetary policymakers need to take the evolution of financial conditions into consideration. For example, when financial conditions tighten sharply, this may mean that monetary policy may need to be tightened by less or even loosened. On the other hand, when financial conditions ease — as has been the case recently — this can provide additional impetus for the decision to continue to remove monetary policy accommodation.
Se confermate, questa parole sarebbe una forte indicazione operativa: la Fed riconosce (finalmente!) che se si alzano i tassi ufficiali tre volte, e i rendimenti delle obbligazioni scendono (mentre la Borsa sale), allora ... c'è qualche cosa di grosso che non va.