Oggi Recce’d pubblica sei nuovi Post. Il lancio della nuova impostazione di questo Blog (a temi, e con un nuovo layout) è stato rinviato al secondo trimestre 2021 in ragione della rapidissima evoluzione della situazione dei mercati finanziari nel mese di gennaio. Per noi di Recce’d, sono sempre i mercati a dettare i tempi. In aggiunta, oggi le occasioni per gli investitori sono le più grandi di una generazione. e noi di certo non vogliamo perderle di vista.
La vicenda Gamestop Robinhood Citadel, come già abbiamo scritto, non è finita, né si concluderà a breve.
La Audizione al Congresso di Washington, qualche giorno fa, ce lo ha detto in modo chiaro. Cinque ore di Audizione non sono state sufficienti neppure per AVVICINARE il cuore di questo problema.
L’Audizione di fatto si è risolta in uno scrutinio, in qualche caso appuntito, del modo di operare di Robinhood. Da qui, a comprendere come la vicenda Gamestop si è sviluppata, c’è molta strada da percorrere.
Moltissima strada, poi, se si intendesse arrivare a comprendere quali sono i meccanismi del mercato di Borsa che oggi rendono possibile una vicenda come questa, e ne renderanno possibili altre nei prossimi mesi.
L’Audizione al Congresso, quindi, ha lasciato le cose come erano prima. Di concreto, noi ne ricaviamo che:
la vicenda si prolungherà, e probabilmente si allargherà, nei prossimi mesi; e che
la vicenda è complessa ed il pubblico (così come il Congresso) la ha capita soltanto per una piccola parte.
La nostra “missione”, fin dal giorno nel quale l’iniziativa chiamata Recce’d è nata, è in primo luogo quello di aiutare a capire. Se non si è capito, non si possono evitare gli errori.
Per capire qualche cosa di più, vi sarà utile leggere, con grande attenzione, un articolo che (lo anticipiamo) è “difficile” sia nella forma sia nella sostanza”.
Ma è indispensabile, affrontare questa “difficoltà”: la vicenda Gamestop Robinhood Citadel non è facile, è difficile, ma se non la capite, nella sua sostanza, allora non capire che cosa succede intorno a voi, e sui mercati finanziari, in questo 2021.
L’articolo fa riferimento alle teorie del professor Akerlof, che è sia Nobel per l’Economia sia marito della Ministra del Tesoro USA (ex Federal Reserve) Janet Yellen.
Wicksell, che oggi chiamiamo in causa in un altro Post, ha lavorato sul tema dei tassi di interesse e del mercato che li determina, Akerlof invece si concentra proprio sul funzionamento di questo mercato:: ci aiuta a capire il comportamento dei vari attori, delle varie parti che compongono quella entità dai contorni indefiniti che tutti chiamiamo “mercato finanziario”.
As Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen puzzles through the GameStop drama, she will likely see insights at every turn from a crucial source: her Nobel-prize-winning husband, George Akerlof.
His discovery was that both sides of a trade know that one side is more informed. This “asymmetric information” drives buyers and sellers apart, completely silencing the market for used cars in his famous example. The translation to securities markets is that asymmetric information drives bids and asks apart, to allow market makers to recoup from uninformed trades what they lose to the informed trades picking them off. This subsidy from uninformed trades pervades the interaction of retail traders with securities markets, whether they know it or not, and it set the stage for the recent show. We can expect it to figure in whatever policy response comes next.
Many if not most people have no view on the pricing of any one stock. To this population, paying a bid-ask spread is getting nothing for something, paying for the mistaken impression that they might know where a stock is going next. They can punt this problem by investing in actively managed funds, though now they have to trust that the managers beat not only the spreads, but also their own expense ratios. Alternatively, they can avoid the problem altogether by indexing. Doing so lowers costs on both fronts: lower expense ratios because investing mechanically is cheap, and lower spreads because index funds step around Akerlof’s trap by signaling the lack of an informational advantage about individual stocks more clearly than individuals can do on their own.
They do this by trading in big, predetermined baskets, such as the entire S&P 500 or Russell 2000. These cost savings have attracted trillions of dollars to passive management, and indexing is now the typical retirement plan for a work-force entrant. But where retail investors trading individual stocks are likely getting nothing for something, those who index instead are hoping to get something for nothing. It is this hope that has dimmed a little in recent weeks.
What indexers want for nothing is the alignment of prices with prospects for future cash flows and value. Those sending a slice of their month-end paychecks to a Russell 2000 index fund hope that others find it in their own interest to keep those 2000 prices in line with the companies’ prospects. And while this hope can withstand buying GameStop for $4.34 at the end of June, $10.20 at the end of September, and then $18.84 at the end of December, it can’t withstand many more episodes like buying GameStop for $325 at the end of January.
How could self-interested capital let this extreme price happen? It appears that many active investors did find it in their interest to bet against the stock as it rose in 2020 by supplying more shares with short sales, but then were squeezed until they took back that supply by covering. That’s when the price went nuts.
So, if squeezes are a problem, can indexers freeload in peace if regulators try to prevent squeezes? Maybe, but attempts to prevent squeezes could endanger the price discovery that indexers and others depend on. Traders disagree, and society discovers prices when it lets this disagreement play out. If traders disagree strongly then some will short aggressively and others will buy long perhaps on margin. Now and then the shorts will run out of cash, so it’s a short squeeze.
Other times, the longs run out of cash, and it’s a bear raid. The traders short of cash can try to raise more, and investors will provide it if warranted and possible. But at what point does the law step in and yell stop? When the price crosses a line? Who decides that GameStop at $100 is OK, but not $101? There may have been bad actors in the GameStop episode, and there are long paper trails to follow before we understand who really did what. But the risk of squeezes and raids may be too bound up in the resolution of honest disagreement to remove without harming price discovery.
Secretary Yellen will see Professor Akerlof’s insight at work not just in the indexing by retail investors, but in their stock trading as well. The customers of Robinhood figure prominently in the GameStop narrative, and much has been made of the zero commissions they pay, and the role of Citadel’s payment for order flow in this “freebie.”
The arrangement might seem sneaky, but at its core it simply monetizes the randomness of Robinhood customers’ trades with respect to what happens next, and hands some of that value back to them. Through Akerlof’s logic we can see the profit from charging a portion of the prevailing spread for uninformed trades. This profit is apparently big enough to eliminate the commission.
The lower cost undoubtedly boosts the democracy of retail participation in the markets, including in squeezes, and this could tempt regulators to protect markets from crowdsourced enthusiasms and retail investors from themselves by raising the cost or limiting access or participation. But markets have always gathered and incorporated information from the diverse experiences of retail and other investors. The consequences for price efficiency can benefit society even if the average retail trade is uninformed and some retail investors make bad bets.
For many investors, reasonable prices are all they want from the markets, and $325 for GameStop was probably not reasonable. So it may seem obvious to some that society should make sure this never happens again. But while reasonable prices might sound like a reasonable expectation, it is not necessarily reasonable to expect something for nothing. The people doing the hard and costly, yet critical work of price discovery have clashed many times before. They will clash again. The resulting sparks might easily be a reasonable price to pay.
Christopher Geczy is an adjunct professor of finance and academic director of the Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research at the Wharton School.
David Musto is the Ronald O. Perelman professor in finance and faculty director of the Stevens Center for Innovation in Finance.